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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
SHIRLEY RODGERS, ) 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
) 
) 
) 
vs. 
ANNIE N. HANSEN and 
ALBERT J. HANSEN, 
Defendants and 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Respondents.) 
Case No. 15334 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Pursuant to Rule 76(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
respondents Annie N. Hansen and Albert J. Hansen respectfully 
petition this Court for a rehearing in the above entitled 
case. This petition is based upon the following reasons: 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
This case arises from the purchase of certain real 
property located in Salt Lake County. The original deed to 
the property which was executed in 1944 listed Myrtle Neil 
and respondents as joint tenants. Mrs. Neil's successor, 
appellant here, brought suit after Mrs. Neil's death seeking 
to quiet title in herself. Appellant alleged that the deed 
had been intended to create a mortgage as between Mrs. Neil 
and the Hansens. The Hansens denied this allegation, saying 
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that the deed accurately reflected the true relationship of 
the parties. 
The trial court found that the parties to the deed 
did not intend to create a mortgage. By its Opinion dated 
May 23, 1978, this Court reversed and found that certain 
receipts signed by Mrs. Hansen acknowledging Mrs. Neil's 
"payment on home" were "clear and convincing" evidence of 
the existence of a mortgage. The Court also held that the 
statute of limitations did not begin to run until Mrs. Neil's 
possession of the property was terminated by her death. 
POINT I 
THE COURT'S DECISION DOES NOT FULLY ADJUDICATE THE 
CONTROVERSY. THE COURT SHOULD DETERMINE WHETHER 
RESPONDENTS ARE ENTITLED TO INTEREST ON THE 
OBLIGATION SECURED BY THEIR "MORTGAGE". 
in part: 
This Court's Opinion dated May 23, 1978, states, 
We conclude that Mr. and Mrs. Hansen have 
an equitable mortgage on the property 
in the amount of $1,055 ••• (Opinion p. 3) 
The decision does not address its elf to the question of whether 
respondents are entitled to interest on this sum. Respondents 
believe that if this Court now refuses to address this issue, 
sale of the premises will be further delayed until the matter 
can be brought before the Court by subsequent litigation. 
Respondents respectfully suggest that in the interest of 
judicial economy the issue should be settled now, by this 
Court. 
Section 15-1-1, Utah Code Annotated (1953) states: 
-2-
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The legal rate of interest for the loan or 
forebearance of money, goods or things in 
action shall be six percent per annum. 
The acknowledgment of the fact that as between Mrs. Neil and 
respondents there existed a contract whereby the Hansens 
would lend Mrs. Neil money and she would repay them is 
implicit in this Court's holding that respondents' interest 
in the subject property is that of a mortgage. There is no 
evidence that an interest rate was ever agreed upon. Thus, 
the case falls squarely within the rule of Section 15-1-1, 
supra. Respondents are therefore entitled to interest on 
the principal amount of the alleged loan from 1944 to the 
present. 
Furthermore, since this is an equitable action, 
respondents ask the Court to consider that the appellant 
and her predecessor have had interest-free use of the "loan" 
proceeds for almost 35 years and that the house purchased 
with respondents' money has increased several fold in value. 
Thus, absent payment of interest, appellant will realize a 
windfall upon the sale of the house. 
Respondents therefore respectfully suggest to the 
Court that it would be inequitable to deny them interest on 
their "investment". 
POINT II 
THIS COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE STATUTE OF 
LIMITATIONS DID NOT BEGIN TO RUN UNTIL MRS. NEIL'S DEATH. 
In its decision this Court held that the statute of 
limitations did not begin to run until Mrs. Neil's death since 
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she was in possession of the premises until that time. 
Although appellant had previously argued that .Laches was 
inapplicable where a joint tenant was in possession, her 
sole argument concerning the statute of limitations was that 
it is inapplicable to a quiet title action. (See Appellant's 
Brief, pp. 16-17.) Appellant never argued that the running 
of the statute was tolled until death of the tenant in 
possession. Thus, the Court adopted a theory never raised 
by appellant, and to which respondents never had a chance 
to respond. Respondents believe that they should be heard 
on this issue and that the Court should reverse itself for 
the following reasons: 
1. The Court's ruling violates accepted principles 
of law. It is well-established in this jurisdiction that 
where the acts of one co-tenant constitute an ouster of 
another co-tenant, the statute of limitations for purposes 
of establishing adverse possession begins to run on the date 
of ouster. Sperry v. Tolley, 114 Utah 303, 199 P.2d 542 
(1948); Rasmussen v. Sevier Valley Canal Co., 48 Utah 490, 160 
P. 444 (1916); Mccready v. Frederickson, 41 Utah 388, 126 P, 
316 (1912). 
In Mccready v. Fredericksen, supra, the court, quoting 
a decision of Justice Taft, stated that an ouster is accom-
plished where one co-tenant "bring[s) it home" to another 
co-tenant that his interest is adverse. 126 P. at 320. 
Similarly, in Rasmussen v. Sevier Valley, supra, the court 
stated that the statute would begin to run from the date of 
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the repudiation of the interests of the co-tenant. 160 
P. at 446. 
Thus, as a general principle, where one co-tenant 
seeks to quiet title against another, the period of limitations 
begins to run when the plaintiff becomes aware of the defendants 
adverse interest. 
As the Court's Opinion notes, Mrs. Neil knew as 
early as 1958 that the Hansens claimed a fee rather than a 
mortgage interest in two-thirds of the property. (See 
Opinion, p. 2.) Thus, the limitations period began to run 
no later than 1958. It is therefore clear that the Court 
was incorrect in ruling that Mrs. Neil and her successor 
were not barred from bringing this action. 
2. The Court's reasoning was erroneous. The Court 
stated that the period of limitations did not begin to run 
until Mrs. Neil's death because, 
The burden on Mrs. Neil to initiate legal action 
can be no greater than the burden on the Hansens 
to establish their claim to the property. 
(Opinion, p. 3.) 
There are two weaknesses in this position: First, 
since the Hansens had previously agreed to Mrs. Neil's 
possession, there was no reason why they should have attempted 
to quiet title against her, particularly in view of the fact 
that as a co-tenant, Mrs. Neil had a possessory interest in 
the property. 
Second, even if it is assumed that both parties had 
the same burden to quiet title to the property, it does not 
-5-
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follow that the statute did not run. On the contrary, the 
only logical conclusion would be that after expiration of 
the statutory period, neither could quiet title -- not 
that both could. 
POINT III 
THE COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT AS BETWEEN MRS. NEIL AND 
THE HANSENS A MORTGAGOR-MORTGAGEE RELATIONSHIP EXISTED 
The Court found that the existence of the receipts 
showing "payment [s] on the house" was "clear and convincing" 
evidence of the existence of a mortgage. Respondents believe 
that the Court confused the concept of an obligation relating 
to real property with the concept of an interest in real 
property created to secure payment of that obligation. 
A mortgage is created in two steps. First, the 
mortgagee gives consideration usually in the form of a 
loan. Second, the mortgagor conveys an interest in real 
property to the mortgagee for the purpose of securing payment 
of the underlying obligation. Thus, it has been stated: 
[A] mortgage is always created by the act 
or agreement of the parties and stands as 
security for the performance of an obli-
gation or the payment of a debt. 
59 C. J. S., Mortgages, § 9 (emphasis added). 
In the instant action, this Court found that the 
existence of the receipts was clear and convincing evidence 
of the existence of a mortgage. Thus, the Court's logic 
appears to have been as follows: Mrs. Neil was indebted~ 
the Hansens for repayment of the money they had spent in 
purchasing the house. Therefore, the Han sens held a mortgage 
not a fee interest. 
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The fallacy in this reasoning is that while the 
receipts may well show the existence of an obligation, they 
can hardly be said to rise to the dignity of "clear and 
convincing" evidence of the existence of an agreement to 
reconvey the property to Mrs. Neil upon payment of the 
obligation. Indeed, no evidence exists as to the existence 
of such an agreement. Thus, the Court's disregarding of the 
trial court's finding of fact on this issue was improper. 
Respondents respectfully suggest to the Court that 
its decision on this issue sets an unfortunate precedence in 
two respects: First, it establishes the principle that this 
court may freely disregard a determination of fact regarding 
the issue of intent which was made by the trier of fact. 
Second, it appears to adopt the rule that the existence of 
a mortgage is presumed where evidence of an indebtedness 
arising from the purchase of real property is adduced. Thus, 
whereas in general a deed absolute may only be altered by 
clear and convincing evidence, where the deed is obtained by 
one co-tenant with the understanding that the other will 
reimburse him for all or part of the purchase price, the 
burden is on the purchaser to show that the deed accurately 
reflects the intention of the parties. Such a rule must 
surely call into question the validity of many deeds heretofore 
executed in this State. 
Appellants believe that the Court's decision is a 
departure from its general policy of upholding the clear 
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language of deeds, and that it should therefore reconsider 
this issue. 
CONCLUSION 
Petitioners/respondents believe that the Court should 
rehear this case for several reasons. 
First, the issue of interest on the alleged mortgage 
was left unresolved. If the Court fails to resolve this 
question, further litigation and a possible subsequent appeal 
may be required. 
Second, the Court erred in ruling that as between 
co-tenants the statute of limitations does not begin to run 
for the adjudication of adverse claims until the death of 
the tenant in possession. By contrast, the law is well-
established that the statute begins to run from the date of 
notice of the adverse claim. 
Third, the Court also erred in holding that proof of 
an obligation arising from purchase of real property is clear 
and convincing evidence of the existence of a mortgage to 
secure payment of that obligation. In reality, there was 
ample evidence that an obligation existed, but little or no 
eviden~e that the debt was secured by a mortgage or provisional 
conveyance. 
Respondents urge the Court to reconsider these issues. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ,;:;Jlt,1 day of July, 1978. 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
? . 4 lt-H/n/j) ~~ Ste~. Gunn ' 
Attorneys for Respondents 
400 Deseret Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-_1_s_o_o~~.-..... sf. 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
A copy of the foregoing Respondents' Petition for 
Rehearing was mailed, postage prepaid and properly addressed, 
to Gordon L. Roberts and Stephen K. Schroeder, Parsons, Behle 
& Latimer, 79 South State Street, P.O. Box 11898, Salt Lake 
city, Utah 84147 on this ~day of July, 1978. 
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